Stake-holders opt for Kayani extension for stability

The Pakistani Quartet

The three main stake holders to the decision of extending Kayani tenure are USA, Zardari government, and the Army itself. Each of them has a vested interest and also keen on stability in the political and security situation of Pakistan, which Kayani appears to guarantee. The army chief will remain in office even after President Zardari retires in September 2013; historically, Generals, who received generous extensions, have had no glorious exit.

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, has received a three–year extension. He will now retire on November 28, 2013; otherwise he was due to retire in another three-months. In any other country, which is a democracy, such along extension in service would have invited a public outcry. But then, Pakistan is not any other country. It’s a nascent democracy, where politicians are not only economical on truth, but also carry fake degree certificates while entering Parliament to be the lawmakers of the nation. So, no surprise, therefore, majority of the people in Pakistan seem unconcerned with the Kayani extension, and also to the fact that the terms of army chief and the Zardari government have become co-terminus.

The three main stake holders to the decision are USA, Zardari government, and the Army itself.  Each of them has a vested interest in Kayani and beyond, and that interest has been factored into the decision process. First and foremost, all the three, in their own way, are keen on “stability” in the political and security situation of the country, which Kayani appears to guarantee.

For President Obama, Kayani holds the key to his Afghan policy of smooth “exit” with the super cop image `unaffected’.  Washington would like to begin the process of withdrawing from the land locked, rugged hill country from the mid-2011 and be done with Kabul syndrome by 2014.  This schedule has its political side; it coincides with the unveiling of Obama’s second White House dream.  If there is any force that can disturb the dream and give nightmares, it is the Pakistan Army, which also can induce a good night’s sleep.

The US Administration, therefore, has little choice. Of course, if it is prepared for a “long haul” in Kabul and Kandahar and is willing to enlist the help of regional powers to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan, Washington can call the Rawalpindi bluff. Such a daring strategy has an inherent flip-side, and the US would have to face a more open Pak army-ISI-Taliban nexus, which is now at a clandestine level.

The recent `WikiLeaks’ offer enough testimony to sceptics that that Gen. Kayani, as the ISI Chief, had fomented trouble for the Americans and their NATO allies.  As the Army chief, he overseas Pakistan’s Afghan strategy and executes it through his trusted Lt General at the helm of ISI, whom he had rewarded with a year’s extension some months ago.  And if the dejure nexus become the defacto nexus, the American and other NATO forces would have many more body bags, and reverses a dozen every day. Neither the American public nor the British people have the stomach for the high casualty rate.  So goaded and guided by short term political rather geo-strategic interest, the Obama administration has reached the conclusion that it has to go with Kayani.

The Asif Ali Zardari government sees in Kayani its own manna. The People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP), which has come to power sacrificing its mascot Benazir Bhutto, has lost the raison d'être to legitimacy and survival  within days of forming the government in alliance with smaller parties.  While it is difficult to crystal gaze as to how Benazir would have acted, and reacted by the turn of events, which have made the party a limpet, the Mr Ten Percent has opted for the easy way. He is surviving on the army’s crutches with a straight face and is keeping under check the dapper Prime Minister Gilani. 

Even as the army was still bandaging the wounds following the booting given to the garrulous Gen Musharraf, his successor at the GHQ, Gen. Kayani had quietly set about undoing the damage to the army image. Robustly demonstrated to the world, ‘who is the real master’. He wounded Zardari and made him lick his wounds publicly.

Consider the Kayani hits. These are direct hits and are one too many which came in quick succession -  on issues such as    shifting the ISI to the control of the Interior Ministry, `no first use’ nuclear strategy, putting Kashmir to back burner, priority to trade in the bilateral imbroglio with India. On all these issues, the Zardari planks were an anathema to the Army, and he had to eat a `humble pie’.

In fact, Zardari has to run for truce with the army for yet another reason. Kayani has the best of relations with the judiciary, having forced the government’s hands on the issue of reinstatement of Chief Justice Chaudhry.   While going slow on the ‘missing persons’ case to the relief of  GHQ,  the Supreme Court has not given up its activism in other spheres that range from statute amendments to fake degrees of law makers, and out of turn promotions in the bureaucracy to muddle in imports,  management of government owned companies, and the Swiss cases. The prospect of re-opening of his old cases and the consequent nightmare of his disqualification has limited President Zardari’s options to just truce with the Army. 

For the Army, extension in service is the richest tribute it can pay to its chief, who has restored its sullied image, gave a semblance of “normalcy” to South Waziristan, appeared to stand up to the American pressure, and catapulted Pakistan to the stage of “honest broker” between the Taliban and the Karzai government. 

Yes, extension to Kayani blocks the upward movement of senior generals, and to that extent it is a cause for unhappiness in the Khaki brotherhood, which is known to protect and further the interests of the fraternity on the lines of a mafia corporate enterprise. The fact that the Corps Commanders gave their green signal to the proposal at their meeting on July 15 shows that the down-the-line concerns had been taken into consideration, and would be addressed properly and fairly.

As a result of the extension to Kayani’s tenure, at least 12 serving Lieutenant Generals will retire between September 2011 and November 2013. 

The list below shows affected the Lt Generals; their retirement date is given in the bracket.

•Lt. Gen. Javed Zia (21 Sep 2011)

•Lt. Gen. Shujat Zameer Dar (21 Sep 2011)

•Lt Gen Mohsin Kamal (21 Sep 2011)

•Lt Gen Jamil Haider (21 Sep 2011)

•Lt Gen Nadeem Taj (28 Apr 2011)

•Lt Gen Tahir Mehmood (29 Sep 2011)

•Lt Gen Tanvir Tahir (Mar 2011)

•Lt Gen Ayaz Saleem Rana (29 Sep 2012)         

•Lt Gen Naeem Khan (13 Oct 2012)

•Lt Gen Khalid Nawaz Khan (04 Oct 2013)

•Lt Gen Sardar Mehmood Ali Khan (4 Oct 2013)

•Lt Gen Mohammad Alam Khattak (04 Oct 2013) and

•Lt Gen Shafqaat Ahmed (04 Oct 2013)

Present thinking in the government and the army is to revive the post of the Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) as a Four Star General to accommodate one of the Corps Commanders.  Like-wise, another senior Corps Commander may be rewarded with a Four Star post as Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCSC) as the incumbent Gen. Tariq Majid is set to retire in two months, on the 8th October. While Mohsin Kamal is tipped to succeed Majid, the new VOOAS is likely to be Kahlid Shameed Wynne.

Now to crystal gazing 2013 scenario.

The term of Parliament ends in March (2013) and Zardari’s stint in the presidential palace in September, but General Kayani retires in November. Put differently, Kayani will outlive the Zardari saga, and may carve out his own niche. What niche it would be is hazardous to guess.

There is no such hazard, however, in concluding that the loser in the unfolding game in Pakistan is former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif despite his best efforts to mend fences with the General Headquarters. His party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) is the ruling party in the all –important province of Punjab, which is the home to the merchants of terrorism who operate in the close proximity of the provincial capital, Lahore.

There are demands for army action in the southern Punjab as the area has turned into a new Swat at the door-step of the national capital. While Nawaz has managed to ward off the threat, it is doubtful as to how long will manage the survival act since his brother, as chief minister of Punjab, has locked horns with the federal government on a host of issues that range from water to tax collections.

A prominent Urdu paper editorially has brought into sharp focus a Pakistani nugget – military rulers extend their careers and end up with a negative result. It cited the Ayub example. Field Marshal Ayub Khan was a beneficiary of President Sikander Mirza’s generosity, and the rest as the saying goes is history. The Kayani effort and effect may claim credit for all the good and leave discredit for all that is wrong to the civilian government. Even then, will he be able to avoid Ayub legacy?

The sedate English daily, ` Dawn’, has used the occasion to recall Mohammad Ali Jinnah had made three months before his death. Addressing the Army Staff College, Quetta on June 14, 1948, Quaid- e- Azam said: 

“One thing more.  I am persuaded to say this because during my talks with one or two very high ranking officers I discovered that they did not know the implications of the oath taken by the troops of Pakistan….I want you to remember….That the executive authority flows from the Head of the Govt. of Pakistan, which is the Governor General, and, therefore, any command or order that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the executive head.  This is the legal position.”

Unsaid in so many words is the observation that some Pakistan army officers had  developed extra constitutional thirst within less than a year of creation of the Land of the Pure, as Jinnah loved to call Pakistan, even when he was very much alive.  The senior-most officer present, at the Quetta meeting, next in seniority to the British Commandant, was one Lt. Col. Mohammad Yahya Khan; and the Quaid- e- Azam' was apparently referring to him.

History, like nature, is unpredictable. It has a tendency to repeat its cycle, just like nature.