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Pakistan Ops Against Militants -Success or Failure
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Pakistan has been claiming that its military offensive in the militant infested tribal belt is a resounding success. Yet militants continue to strike at will in the tribal region and beyond also and this brings into question the official claims. Is the Military offensive a real success story, asks the analyst while looking at the 'balance sheet'.
2009 marked the year when Pakistan’s army and political leadership took the decision to commence military operations against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant/terrorist organisations, including Al Qaeda, in the country’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The success of the operations has been difficult to gauge, with disparate accounts both from within and outside the conflict areas.
Pakistan’s military has claimed a resounding success over the TTP – recapturing former terrorist strongholds such as Swat, Malakand, Kurram Agency, Kohat, Orakzai, Bannu and large parts of South Waziristan. However, the cost of the operations has been exceptional – both monetarily, and in terms of loss of life.
Estimates suggest that 21,672 civilians have been killed or injured since Sept 11, 2001. The casualty list for Pakistan’s army stands at 8785, while 17,742 terrorists have been killed or arrested over the same period. The Urdu dailies, Jasarat, Jang and Urdu Point report that 10,000 people were killed in 2009 alone – a figure much higher than what the coalition has lost in Afghanistan, and a point which Pakistani politicians and the media repeatedly bring up to highlight their ‘commitment’ to the war on terror.
While there is no doubting the casualty figures, there are serious questions with regards to how successful the military operations actually have been – with the clearing of areas achieved in unprecedented time and, the number of terrorists captured and/or killed much lower than estimates of how many lived in the areas prior to the operations.
NET SUCCESS OR FAILURE
Arguably, one of the biggest moments in Pakistan military operations, in conjunction with the recapturing of terrorist dominated territory, came with the death of TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud – ironically at the hands of a CIA drone strike, which Pakistan’s politicians and media have been vehemently opposing. Similarly, and while reports are still to be confirmed, his successor Hakimullah Mehsud was killed by a strike in January 2010.
The deaths of these two leaders, along with the arrests of ‘smaller’ commanders are frequently cited as indicators of a successful military operation. Yet, the parameters for success are questionable. Estimates in 2009 suggested that South Waziristan alone had upwards of 30,000 militants – a number which has not been accounted for by the military, prompting questions of their whereabouts. A large number of civilian population fled the area prior to the commencement of (and even during, according to some reports) the military campaign.
When put in the context of how quickly Pakistan’s army was able to overrun the militant strongholds, it would appear as though a large number of the militants left the areas in search of shelter in South Punjab and North Waziristan, under the guise of being Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Army Chief Kayani’s recent comments that the South Waziristan operations would end on March 30, suggests that the resistance offered by the Taliban was minimal, allowing the army to recapture the areas relatively quickly, while creating a false sense of security. Not surprisingly, the US based global intelligence company Stratfor, says, the US “would have to think twice” about such an offensive, adding that they were not sure if Pakistan’s military was trained and equipped for such operations.
The offensive in the tribal region was primarily a result of US pressure; the deal with TNSM leader Sufi Muhammad broke as a result of the same factor. With different sections of the ruling elite having different perspectives on how to address the problem, Pakistan was engaged in a war for which there was no consensus – meaning that a lack of common motivation would ultimately diminish the returns of success.
JUI-F leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman was openly not in favour of the offensive. Former ISI Chief Hamid Gul termed the military offensive as a US conspiracy.
As the military was forced to enter into a war for which they lacked the resolve, Pakistan’s urban centres experienced a surge in terrorist attacks – slowly but surely turning public sentiment against the TTP, in what had otherwise been an apathetic attitude. In addition, the destruction of schools and the enforcement of a skewed version of Sharia law in Swat prompted a change in pubic sentiment – forcing the army to intervene in a fight against its own people, for which it had no interest. However, the delayed reactions of Pakistan’s political and military decision makers allowed the TTP to reinforce its presence in Pakistan’s interiors, thus avoiding the radar of security forces.
ATTACKS CONTINUE
Pakistan’s military has claimed a resounding success over the TTP – recapturing former terrorist strongholds such as Swat, Malakand, Kurram Agency, Kohat, Orakzai, Bannu and large parts of South Waziristan. However, the cost of the operations has been exceptional – both monetarily, and in terms of loss of life.
Estimates suggest that 21,672 civilians have been killed or injured since Sept 11, 2001. The casualty list for Pakistan’s army stands at 8785, while 17,742 terrorists have been killed or arrested over the same period. The Urdu dailies, Jasarat, Jang and Urdu Point report that 10,000 people were killed in 2009 alone – a figure much higher than what the coalition has lost in Afghanistan, and a point which Pakistani politicians and the media repeatedly bring up to highlight their ‘commitment’ to the war on terror.
While there is no doubting the casualty figures, there are serious questions with regards to how successful the military operations actually have been – with the clearing of areas achieved in unprecedented time and, the number of terrorists captured and/or killed much lower than estimates of how many lived in the areas prior to the operations.
NET SUCCESS OR FAILURE
Arguably, one of the biggest moments in Pakistan military operations, in conjunction with the recapturing of terrorist dominated territory, came with the death of TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud – ironically at the hands of a CIA drone strike, which Pakistan’s politicians and media have been vehemently opposing. Similarly, and while reports are still to be confirmed, his successor Hakimullah Mehsud was killed by a strike in January 2010.
The deaths of these two leaders, along with the arrests of ‘smaller’ commanders are frequently cited as indicators of a successful military operation. Yet, the parameters for success are questionable. Estimates in 2009 suggested that South Waziristan alone had upwards of 30,000 militants – a number which has not been accounted for by the military, prompting questions of their whereabouts. A large number of civilian population fled the area prior to the commencement of (and even during, according to some reports) the military campaign.
When put in the context of how quickly Pakistan’s army was able to overrun the militant strongholds, it would appear as though a large number of the militants left the areas in search of shelter in South Punjab and North Waziristan, under the guise of being Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Army Chief Kayani’s recent comments that the South Waziristan operations would end on March 30, suggests that the resistance offered by the Taliban was minimal, allowing the army to recapture the areas relatively quickly, while creating a false sense of security. Not surprisingly, the US based global intelligence company Stratfor, says, the US “would have to think twice” about such an offensive, adding that they were not sure if Pakistan’s military was trained and equipped for such operations.
The offensive in the tribal region was primarily a result of US pressure; the deal with TNSM leader Sufi Muhammad broke as a result of the same factor. With different sections of the ruling elite having different perspectives on how to address the problem, Pakistan was engaged in a war for which there was no consensus – meaning that a lack of common motivation would ultimately diminish the returns of success.
JUI-F leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman was openly not in favour of the offensive. Former ISI Chief Hamid Gul termed the military offensive as a US conspiracy.
As the military was forced to enter into a war for which they lacked the resolve, Pakistan’s urban centres experienced a surge in terrorist attacks – slowly but surely turning public sentiment against the TTP, in what had otherwise been an apathetic attitude. In addition, the destruction of schools and the enforcement of a skewed version of Sharia law in Swat prompted a change in pubic sentiment – forcing the army to intervene in a fight against its own people, for which it had no interest. However, the delayed reactions of Pakistan’s political and military decision makers allowed the TTP to reinforce its presence in Pakistan’s interiors, thus avoiding the radar of security forces.
ATTACKS CONTINUE
Despite claims by the army of successful operations in NWFP and FATA, both regions continue to experience terrorist attacks, particularly in Kurram Agency, Mingora, Bajaur and Peshawar. With these attacks occurring under the backdrop of a significant military presence in the area, the claims by Pakistan’s army and government appear all the more dubious. It is important to note, that such attacks point to the fact that the areas are not conducive for the return of IDPs. Already several areas are showing signs of resurgent militant activity. If such a scenario were to continue, there is a very real prospect that military gains will be short lived, with the TTP and other terrorist/militant groups eventually returning to the areas which have traditionally been their safe havens.
Obviously, the operations have been carried out without a strategic long term planning in place. The government’s approach has been to focus on the military angle, while paying comparatively little attention to the rehabilitation of the IDPs and/or their eventual return. That is why, the decision to hand over ‘the cleared areas’ to the civil administration is pregnant with dangers.
TTP BACK IN FORM
An indication that the army’s initiative in NWFP and FATA has not been as successful as proclaimed is with the growing number of terrorist attacks in the interiors of the country – particularly in Lahore, Karachi and Faisalabad. The frequency and ease with which these attacks have been occurring and the fact that the TTP has claimed responsibility for almost all of them, suggests that the organisation has strengthened its network in the densely populated areas of the country. This is further backed by reports in Ummat and Jang which talk of the TTP vowing to carry out attacks on important personalities and defence personnel from March onwards.
In addition, the arrests of a large number of terrorists hailing from South and North Waziristan in cities such as Islamabad, reinforces the notion that the TTP will engage security forces and the government in a new urban warfare scenario – where they hold the advantage of being firmly entrenched within the country’s cities.
Punjab province has seen a resurgence of groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi – both banned organisations, which could be tapped by the TTP for logistical, if not militant, support. The rise in terrorist activity in urban centres and the arrest of terrorists from Waziristan, provide further credence to the notion that the ease at which the army conducted its operations in NWFP and FATA, was in no small measure a result of a large number of terrorists fleeing the region as IDPs, prior to the commencement of the military manoeuvres.
CONCLUSION
Finally, the decision by the Pakistani courts to not hand over arrested terrorists such as Mullah Badar and other Taliban leaders to the US and Afghanistan, despite being wanted in both countries, suggests that there continues to remain disagreement within Pakistan establishment on how to address the TTP problem. Given that elements within the ISI and army continue to remain sympathetic if not morally and logistically linked to these groups, there is a real possibility that Pakistan’s fight against the TTP has already failed – owing primarily to the fact that it never really took off as a result of a lack of political and military consensus amongst the decision makers and, perhaps more importantly, historical loyalties which have been hard to shed.
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