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Afghanistan through Taliban prism, risk of derailing democratic process

08 February, 2010 10:57:00 .

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Taliban, encouraged by the signals from the US, is unlikely to agree to relinquish the power they currently hold. Instead, they will insist on some sort of power sharing deal, which given their mindset, could see a struggle for power and an eventual derailment of the democratic process. The liberties and freedom currently experienced by the Afghans people could be curtailed particularly in areas with a large Taliban presence, says the analyst

SUMMARY
The American ‘war on terror’ has for the most part not gone as smoothly as Washington would have hoped, with Al-Qaeda terrorists still posing a major security threat, and the Taliban continuing to offer stiff resistance to US led NATO forces in Afghanistan. The apparent miscalculation by American policy makers vis-à-vis operations in Afghanistan, has forced allied forces to rethink their Afghan strategy, with the latest initiative, underscored by the ‘London Conference’, looking to rework the Afghanistan equation. The proposal to divide the Afghan Taliban into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and negotiate with the former is a dangerous proposition. In addition, Washington’s decision to send an additional 30,000 US troops has been taken with a short term perspective, with the proposed phased withdrawal by mid 2011, likely to strengthen the resolve of the Taliban militants. The announcement to pull back troops, coupled with diplomatic feelers for negotiations is a clear signal that the US led war in Afghanistan is failing. In addition, it signals that Washington is running out of ideas to address the issue, which for the most part is domestically unpopular in the US.

CURRENT SCENARIO

Washington’s approach to the ‘London Conference’ and its stated intentions to negotiate with the Taliban is complex and dangerous. Unlike Iraq, where the US faced little to no resistance from Iraqi forces, the Afghan Taliban continue to occupy vast tracts of the country and have the support of a significant number of people. While a large number of those supporting the Taliban might do so under fear of repercussions, the fact remains that the Taliban are a violent, oppressive regime, which has shown on numerous occasions that they are capable of attacking Afghan, NATO and Indian interests not only in the interiors of the country, but in the capital city Kabul. The ability of the Taliban to challenge the Hamid Karzai led government and security forces, reiterates the point that a democratic Afghanistan will be unable to defend itself or its people under current circumstances. More importantly, the relatively inexperienced government, which is riddled with corruption, could face internal challenges to power post the American withdrawal – a fact which could be exacerbated by pressure exerted by the Taliban.

The Taliban, led by Mullah Omar maintain close relations with Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda. In addition, there are links to Pakistan based Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), all of which threaten regional stability. It is important to note that the Taliban have also maintained historical links to Pakistan’s ISI – a body which is known to have nurtured terrorist and militant groups in the region. The ability and ease at which the Afghan Taliban and the TTP are able to carry out attacks both within Afghanistan and Pakistan suggests that relations continue to exist with elements both within the Afghan security and government apparatus and Pakistan’s ISI. A decision to negotiate with the Taliban based on the notion that they can be legitimately separated between good and bad, assumes that allied forces will be dealing directly with the militants – a fact which is unlikely, given their historical links to the ISI. From a moral point of view, the announcement to negotiate is likely to strengthen the resolve of the Taliban, which in all likelihood will not break its links with Al Qaeda – a group which it has been providing sanctuary to post September 11th 2001.

Washington’s decision to allow Pakistan to play a decisive role in negotiations with the Taliban is unlikely to produce favourable results, so long as elements opposed to America’s presence in the region, and determined to challenge India over the Kashmir issue, continue to exist within Pakistan’s security apparatus. Pakistan’s war in NWFP must not be confused with their resolve to sincerely dismantle the Taliban. Pakistan’s military operations are largely in response to the surge in terrorist attacks within their country, and as such, are in their interest to address. The Taliban in Afghanistan do not pose any direct threat to Islamabad, having existed prior to the American invasion, with little or no impact on domestic politics in Pakistan. More importantly, Pakistan’s interest in negotiating with the Afghan Taliban is likely to be under the pretext of removing America’s presence in the region, and regaining their clout in Kabul – a fact which has been diminished post the American invasion. The two sided approach by Pakistan is apparent through their clear and frequent denouncements of India’s presence in Afghanistan and, by the fact that the TTP and other terrorist elements continue to operate from the mountainous regions of Pakistan, remaining largely unchallenged, as they mount cross-border attacks on allied forces.

Pakistan’s role as a negotiator is an important aspect with regards to India’s regional interests. Individuals such as Fazlur Rehman of Jamiat Islami hold considerable political sway with the Taliban and could possibly feature as a representative for talks. However, the increasing influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan is likely to create more challenges for India – with the possibility of an ISI-Taliban nexus re-surfacing.

FUTURE UNCERTAIN

Assuming negotiations are successful, India will be faced with the prospect of an Afghanistan which to some extent has provisions for the Taliban within a framework for governance. The eventual withdrawal of US forces is likely to create a political and security vacuum in the country, which could be derailed by a resurgent Taliban, backed by elements within Pakistan. The likelihood of Mullah Omer and Hamid Karzai coexisting in the interest of Afghanistan is slim to none. This is likely to result in a struggle for power between the democratic forces established and backed by the US and the Taliban, which is likely to be strengthened and more visible on the ground. In addition, the ISI’s relations with the Taliban are likely to result in pro-Islamabad decisions being made in Kabul post a US withdrawal and successful negotiations.

It is important to note that negotiations with the Taliban, coupled with the eventual withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan could result in a possible nexus between anti-India terrorist groups. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa, led by Hafiz Saeed is known to have links with the ISI and has repeatedly called for jihad to be waged against India over the Kashmir issue. Similarly, the Taliban with known links to the ISI could be encouraged to collaborate with JuD, the LeT and other such groups, by elements within Pakistan. An Afghanistan void of US forces, and where negotiations have ensured a larger presence of the so called ‘good’ Taliban could multiply problems for India, and as such could be dangerous with regards to India’s national security.

In all likelihood, the Afghani people will suffer from the consequences of negotiations with the Taliban. The Afghan Taliban is unlikely to accept a decision which would see them relinquish the power which they currently hold. As a result, negotiations would have to resemble some sort of power sharing agreement between the current democratically elected government and the Taliban. In such an eventuality, an agreement might see the Taliban have a presence in Kabul and in other provinces across the country. Given their radical/fundamental approach to ‘governance’ there is a distinct possibility that the liberties and freedom currently experienced by the Afghani people could be curtailed in certain parts of the country – particularly those with a large Taliban presence. In the worst case scenario, the country could see a struggle for power and an eventual derailment of the democratic process.

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