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Cribbing Over Conditionalities
As Kerry-Lugar bill is about to deliver $1.5bn, a section of Pakistanis are not comfortable with the conditionalities and this raises doubts about Pakistan's commitment to fight Islamist terror, says our guest analyst..
With the US Congress having passed the ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act’, Pakistan will soon start receiving an annual economic assistance package of $1.5 billion for the next five years. Normally a legislation such as this which triples the quantum of aid should be warmly welcomed by both the recipient country and the donor country. But the Kerry-Lugar bill has so far only caused immense heart-burn – in Pakistan where the conditionalities contained in the bill are seen as demeaning, or worse, an assault on the country’s sovereignty and that too for a ‘pittance’; among influential US Congressmen and Senators who continue to doubt Pakistan's commitment in fighting Islamist terror groups; and predictably enough, in India there is a sense of disquiet over the enhanced US assistance to Pakistan which could be used against India.
Perhaps the Pakistanis have a point when they say that $1.5 billion per year is a very paltry amount and is not going to go help very much. What is, however, not understandable is the whining about how cheaply Pakistan has sold itself to the Americans. This is like saying that if the price was right, they would have no compunctions on swallowing the bitter pill of compromising their self-respect, independence and sovereignty by accepting the conditions enshrined in the aid package. Clearly then, it is not so much the compromise on the principle that bothers the cribbers; rather it is the ‘peanuts’ they are being paid for compromising on the principle that they find so outrageous.
Prima facie, the conditions imposed in the Kerry-Lugar bill would certainly appear harsh and humiliating to Pakistanis. But viewed in the proper perspective, the complaints over the terms and conditions of the Kerry-Lugar bill are somewhat misplaced, more so since the violation of these conditionalities will affect not the economic assistance programme but only the security-related assistance, the details of which have not been specified. The violations can however be waived off “if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.” In other words, it is entirely possible that despite Pakistani violations of these red lines, the security-assistance will continue as long as US strategic compulsions dictate so. This is exactly what happened during the 1980’s on the issue of the Pressler amendment.
Strict adherence to the conditionalities would, however, be good for Pakistan, good for the US and good even for India. Take for instance the US insistence on an elaborate and quite intrusive system of accounting and auditing of the aid package. This is being done to ensure that there are no leakages and diversions of the aid money and that money is used for the purpose it has been sanctioned, something that should address Indian apprehensions of aid being diverted for military purposes. The strict monitoring of the aid does not however raise the hackles in Pakistan as much as the conditions relating to democratic governance, combating terrorism and dismantling nuclear proliferation networks.
On nuclear proliferation, the US secretary of state will have to certify that “the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks”. Unless Pakistan wants to restart the nuclear Wal-Mart being run by Dr AQ Khan with the connivance of Pakistan’s military establishment, it should not really have a problem with this condition. The stopping of proliferation to and from Pakistan is something that serves Indian interests as well.
The second major objection being raised by Pakistanis relates to the conditionalities seeking to promote democracy in Pakistan and empower the civilian government and institutions. Every year the US secretary of state is required to certify that “the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan”. In addition, the secretary of state will have to provide appropriate congressional committees “an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.”
Only someone who seeks to perpetuate the hold of the army on the politics of the country would object to or resent this conditionality. In every functioning democracy where civilian supremacy is firmly established (India for example) all top military appointments are entirely the prerogative of the civilian government, as are all important policy decisions. But given the peculiarities and weaknesses of Pakistani democracy such a condition affirms US commitment to empowering civilian institutions in Pakistan and supporting a stable democratic order.
As far as the Americans are concerned, they are trying hard to change the widely, and perhaps correctly, held perception inside Pakistan that they are more favourably inclined to and comfortable dealing with military strongmen who serve as a single window clearance as opposed to civilian politicians who have to try and keep the public mood in mind before taking any decision. For anyone in Pakistan to construe this condition to mean that the US will henceforth influence decisions on military promotions is quite preposterous. But even if this were the case, surely senior appointments in the army of people who are opposed to the Islamists and who are apolitical is something that is also in Pakistan's interest.
The third and potentially most critical conditionality is over the issue of terrorism. According to the Kerry-Lugar bill, the secretary of state has to certify that “the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups”. This includes ending all support by state agencies like ISI to terror groups, a crackdown on groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and preventing any use of Pakistani territory for carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing down all terrorist camps and dismantling terrorist bases.
Clearly, the benchmarks set on the issue of terrorism seek to make the Pakistani government live up to its oft stated commitment to “fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations”. The reference to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad and the inclusion of places like the LeT headquarters, Muridke, is a clear signal to Pakistan that the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jihadists no longer washes with the US. Pakistanis are being rather disingenuous when they argue that terrorism related conditions amount to an acceptance of the charges that Pakistan was indeed involved in sponsoring terrorism. It is one thing to be in denial over the activities of jihadists operating as instruments of state policy and quite another trying to deceive rest of the world of this immutable reality.
Of course, the Pakistanis are justified in their apprehension that Pakistan will be held hostage to any act of terror by jihadist groups acting on their own and without any state support, involvement or sponsorship. But the fact is that no one (not even India) expects Pakistan to deliver overnight on these terrorism conditionalities. What everyone expects however is a sincere and serious effort by Pakistan to dismantle the physical, political, and ideological infrastructure that provides sustenance to the jihadist groups.
For its part, India should welcome the Kerry-Lugar bill. The quantum of aid is such that it will at best keep Pakistan on life support and reduce it into a dependency of the US, which is not a bad thing for India. After all, India has been unable enforce compliance on Pakistan and depends on the US and other Western countries to pressure Pakistan on issues of concern to India. The more Pakistan becomes dependant on the US, the more the possibility of India being able to use US influence on Pakistan for its own ends.
With the Kerry-Lugar bill being passed, the ball will now be in the court of Pakistan which will have to decide whether to accept or reject the conditions contained in the bill. Despite all the angst over the conditionalities in the bill, chances are that Pakistan will accept the bill. Pakistan of 2009 simply does not have the economic, military and strategic space that was available to the Pakistan of 1980 when Gen. Ziaul Haq could reject the initial US offer of economic assistance by calling it ‘peanuts’. The fact of the matter is that on its own resources Pakistan is no longer a sustainable entity. And while Pakistan could still try and develop a taste for grass by rejecting US assistance, there is no way it can economically sustain the fight against the Islamist insurgency without external assistance. This is something that the Pakistanis should bear in mind before they mindlessly oppose the US munificence.
Perhaps the Pakistanis have a point when they say that $1.5 billion per year is a very paltry amount and is not going to go help very much. What is, however, not understandable is the whining about how cheaply Pakistan has sold itself to the Americans. This is like saying that if the price was right, they would have no compunctions on swallowing the bitter pill of compromising their self-respect, independence and sovereignty by accepting the conditions enshrined in the aid package. Clearly then, it is not so much the compromise on the principle that bothers the cribbers; rather it is the ‘peanuts’ they are being paid for compromising on the principle that they find so outrageous.
Prima facie, the conditions imposed in the Kerry-Lugar bill would certainly appear harsh and humiliating to Pakistanis. But viewed in the proper perspective, the complaints over the terms and conditions of the Kerry-Lugar bill are somewhat misplaced, more so since the violation of these conditionalities will affect not the economic assistance programme but only the security-related assistance, the details of which have not been specified. The violations can however be waived off “if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.” In other words, it is entirely possible that despite Pakistani violations of these red lines, the security-assistance will continue as long as US strategic compulsions dictate so. This is exactly what happened during the 1980’s on the issue of the Pressler amendment.
Strict adherence to the conditionalities would, however, be good for Pakistan, good for the US and good even for India. Take for instance the US insistence on an elaborate and quite intrusive system of accounting and auditing of the aid package. This is being done to ensure that there are no leakages and diversions of the aid money and that money is used for the purpose it has been sanctioned, something that should address Indian apprehensions of aid being diverted for military purposes. The strict monitoring of the aid does not however raise the hackles in Pakistan as much as the conditions relating to democratic governance, combating terrorism and dismantling nuclear proliferation networks.
On nuclear proliferation, the US secretary of state will have to certify that “the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks”. Unless Pakistan wants to restart the nuclear Wal-Mart being run by Dr AQ Khan with the connivance of Pakistan’s military establishment, it should not really have a problem with this condition. The stopping of proliferation to and from Pakistan is something that serves Indian interests as well.
The second major objection being raised by Pakistanis relates to the conditionalities seeking to promote democracy in Pakistan and empower the civilian government and institutions. Every year the US secretary of state is required to certify that “the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan”. In addition, the secretary of state will have to provide appropriate congressional committees “an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.”
Only someone who seeks to perpetuate the hold of the army on the politics of the country would object to or resent this conditionality. In every functioning democracy where civilian supremacy is firmly established (India for example) all top military appointments are entirely the prerogative of the civilian government, as are all important policy decisions. But given the peculiarities and weaknesses of Pakistani democracy such a condition affirms US commitment to empowering civilian institutions in Pakistan and supporting a stable democratic order.
As far as the Americans are concerned, they are trying hard to change the widely, and perhaps correctly, held perception inside Pakistan that they are more favourably inclined to and comfortable dealing with military strongmen who serve as a single window clearance as opposed to civilian politicians who have to try and keep the public mood in mind before taking any decision. For anyone in Pakistan to construe this condition to mean that the US will henceforth influence decisions on military promotions is quite preposterous. But even if this were the case, surely senior appointments in the army of people who are opposed to the Islamists and who are apolitical is something that is also in Pakistan's interest.
The third and potentially most critical conditionality is over the issue of terrorism. According to the Kerry-Lugar bill, the secretary of state has to certify that “the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups”. This includes ending all support by state agencies like ISI to terror groups, a crackdown on groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and preventing any use of Pakistani territory for carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing down all terrorist camps and dismantling terrorist bases.
Clearly, the benchmarks set on the issue of terrorism seek to make the Pakistani government live up to its oft stated commitment to “fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations”. The reference to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad and the inclusion of places like the LeT headquarters, Muridke, is a clear signal to Pakistan that the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jihadists no longer washes with the US. Pakistanis are being rather disingenuous when they argue that terrorism related conditions amount to an acceptance of the charges that Pakistan was indeed involved in sponsoring terrorism. It is one thing to be in denial over the activities of jihadists operating as instruments of state policy and quite another trying to deceive rest of the world of this immutable reality.
Of course, the Pakistanis are justified in their apprehension that Pakistan will be held hostage to any act of terror by jihadist groups acting on their own and without any state support, involvement or sponsorship. But the fact is that no one (not even India) expects Pakistan to deliver overnight on these terrorism conditionalities. What everyone expects however is a sincere and serious effort by Pakistan to dismantle the physical, political, and ideological infrastructure that provides sustenance to the jihadist groups.
For its part, India should welcome the Kerry-Lugar bill. The quantum of aid is such that it will at best keep Pakistan on life support and reduce it into a dependency of the US, which is not a bad thing for India. After all, India has been unable enforce compliance on Pakistan and depends on the US and other Western countries to pressure Pakistan on issues of concern to India. The more Pakistan becomes dependant on the US, the more the possibility of India being able to use US influence on Pakistan for its own ends.
With the Kerry-Lugar bill being passed, the ball will now be in the court of Pakistan which will have to decide whether to accept or reject the conditions contained in the bill. Despite all the angst over the conditionalities in the bill, chances are that Pakistan will accept the bill. Pakistan of 2009 simply does not have the economic, military and strategic space that was available to the Pakistan of 1980 when Gen. Ziaul Haq could reject the initial US offer of economic assistance by calling it ‘peanuts’. The fact of the matter is that on its own resources Pakistan is no longer a sustainable entity. And while Pakistan could still try and develop a taste for grass by rejecting US assistance, there is no way it can economically sustain the fight against the Islamist insurgency without external assistance. This is something that the Pakistanis should bear in mind before they mindlessly oppose the US munificence.
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