UN Commission Report on Benazir's murder -Part V

....contd... PART -V

The criminal investigations

238.    There was not an effective or active criminal investigation of either the Karachi
or the Rawalpindi attacks.  This is inexplicable in terms of the basic principles of
effective police work and contrary to the legal responsibilities of the relevant
authorities.

239.    There is no evidence that the Rawalpindi police made any attempt to seal the
crime scene in the aftermath of Ms Bhutto’s assassination despite the purported 1,371
strong police deployment.  The decision to use a fire hose on the crime scene within
one hour and forty minutes of the attack – allegedly because of civil unrest and in
order to prevent rioting – is not acceptable, and effectively destroyed evidence.  This
destruction made it extremely difficult if not impossible to gather more DNA
evidence than the minimal amount already gathered.  This massive loss of evidence
did irreparable damage to the crime scene.  Contrary to the 23 pieces of evidence
gathered by the police, attacks of this type would typically result in the collection of
thousands of pieces of evidence.   

240.    The Commission is not convinced that the decision to wash the scene was made
by CPO Saud Aziz alone.  The attack was too significant and the target of the attack
too important to Pakistani society to make such a decision solely on his level.  
Sources told the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz was constantly talking on his
mobile phone while at the hospital.  In the Commission’s view, he has not adequately
explained who called him during that time.  Other sources have provided credible
information about the intervention of intelligence agencies in the case.  Whoever was
responsible for this decision, and for whatever reason, acted in a manner that is
contrary to the most basic police standards and hampered the proper investigation of
the assassination.   

241.    The handling of other important items of evidence, most significantly the
failure to preserve the vehicle in which Ms Bhutto rode and other vehicles for
technical examination prevented the gathering of important evidence.   

242.    The absence of an autopsy caused serious damage to the investigation.  The
lack of a clear cause of death established by an autopsy severely affected the
credibility of the Government among the general public and has given rise to wide
speculation as to the cause of Ms Bhutto’s death.  CPO Saud Aziz again appears in a
setting in which he seems to have been able to impede the effective investigation of
the crime.  Again, it is unlikely that a police officer of his level could make such
significant and ultimately destructive decisions on his own and wield such power.  
CPO Saud Aziz maintains that he did not deny any requests for an autopsy.   

243.    The Government press conference of 28 December 2007 – the day after the
assassination and the day that the Joint Investigation Team was formed – prejudiced
the investigation and eroded public confidence.  This problem is especially acute
because Pakistan was led by a military government in a society in which the military
has significant and broad authority.  The Commission concludes that the decision for
the press conference was made by General Musharraf.  

244.    The investigation of the JIT, apart from the first few days after the attack, was
characterized by inaction.

245.    After the early actions of the members of the JIT, particularly by the Federal
Investigation Agency members, the JIT relied almost exclusively on information
received from intelligence agencies without follow up police work.  They did not
engage in the most basic police procedures, such as interviewing the occupants of Ms
Bhutto’s vehicle.  Even if those persons and others within the PPP did not wish to
cooperate with the authorities, the Pakistani police had the means to summon
participation, and it is surprising that they did not, given the seriousness of the crime.   

246.    There has been essentially no communication between the Karachi police
officials investigating the Karachi attack and the Rawalpindi police officials in the
JIT investigating the assassination.  The two police investigations remain
unconnected, despite the need for full communication and cooperation in these linked
complex cases.

247.    The Commission is concerned that its existence enabled the authorities
responsible for the investigation to slow their activities. For exa mple, the
Government, which has been in office since April 2008, only commenced the futher
investigation in October 2009.  The Commission’s effort to determine the facts and
circumstances of Ms Bhutto’s assassination is not a substitute for an effective, official
criminal investigation.  These activities should have been carried out simultaneously.  
Ms Bhutto was killed more than two years ago.  A Government headed by her party,
the PPP, has been in office for most of that time, and it only began the further
investigation, a renewal of the stalled official investigation, in October 2009.  This is
surprising to the Commission.

Role of intelligence agencies10

248.    A number of knowledgeable and credible persons with whom the Commission
spoke cited the pervasive reach, control and clandestine role of intelligence agencies
in Pakistani society.  In the course of this inquiry, the Commission encountered
abundant confirmation of this not only in law enforcement matters, but also in various
aspects of the country’s political life during 2007.  

249.    Particularly noteworthy was the intense involvement of intelligence agencies in
criminal investigations.  While it is often necessary, especially in terrorism cases, for
intelligence agencies to provide significant assistance to police investigative
authorities, in the investigation of Ms Bhutto’s assassination, the role of intelligence
agencies far exceeded an assisting role, with the effect of subordinating law
enforcement institutions.  

250.    The agencies, and in particular the ISI, carried out parallel investigations into
both the Karachi attack and the assassination in Rawalpindi.  A former intelligence
official with direct knowledge of the matter told the Commission that the ISI had
conducted its own investigation of the Karachi attack and had successfully detained
four men who provided logistical support for the attack.  None of the police or other
civilian officials interviewed by the Commission regarding Karachi reported any
knowledge of such detentions.  The same source told the Commission that ISI agents
covering Ms Bhutto’s meeting in Liaquat Bagh on 27 December were the first to
secure her vehicle and take photos of it after the attack there, among other actions.  
One very prominent and directly knowledgeable former government official informed
the Commission that the ISI was, in fact, responsible for the investigation of Ms
Bhutto’s assassination.  Others have asserted that the Intelligence Bureau had and still
has a significant role in the investigation.   

251.    Members of the JIT that investigated Ms Bhutto’s assassination all but admitted
that virtually all of their most important information, including that which led to the
identification and arrest of those suspects now in prison, came from intelligence
agencies.  The Commission is satisfied that this was the case given that there is little


indication that the JIT considered any other hypotheses, followed leads or developed
its own evidence beyond the framework set by those agencies.   

252.    Several high-ranking law enforcement officials expressed concerns to the
Commission that resources to build investigative capacity, especially in terrorism
cases, have gone to the intelligence agencies, while police resources and capacity lag.  
Indeed, in the aftermath of the attempts on General Mus harraf’s life, the capacity of
the ISI was strengthened to allow it to engage more effectively in such investigations.  
This tendency has led to a distortion and imbalance in the functions of these
institutions and presents a challenge for the future in ensuring the democratic rule of
law.  

253.    Given the historical and possibly continuing relationships between intelligence
agencies and some radical Islamist groups that engage in extremist violence, the
agencies could be compromised in their investigations of crimes possibly carried out
by such groups.

254.    Wiretapping can, of course, be a legitimate intelligence and law enforcement
tool.  Yet in its efforts to determine the provenance and authenticity of the phone
intercept used to implicate Baitullah Mehsud in the assassination of Ms Bhutto, the
Commission received credible information regarding the systematic wire- tapping by
the ISI and the IB not only of suspected terrorists and other criminals, but also of
politicians, government officials, journalists and social activists.  These activities are
not authorized or overseen by judicial authorities and are not in keeping with the
operations of such agencies in a democratic society.   

255.    Beyond their involvement in criminal investigations, the Commission
encountered a far-reaching presence of intelligence agencies in several key aspects of
the tumultuous events of 2007, which formed in important part in shaping the
circumstances and context of Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan.  This pervasive
presence at times called into question the ability of other institutions to exercise their
full, independent mandate and functions.   

256.    The electoral process was one such area.  The involvement of intelligence
agencies, and specifically the ISI, in influencing electoral outcomes in past elections
is well-documented and was confirmed to the Commission by a former senior
intelligence official.  Ms Bhutto had her own concerns and reportedly asked General
Musharraf that ISI interference in the elections be curbed as part of guaranteeing free
and fair elections.  The day after her July meeting in Abu Dhabi with General
Musharraf, an aide to Ms Bhutto was sent secretly to Islamabad on her behalf to
review the work of the firm hired to create the new electoral lists; his site visits for
this purpose were facilitated directly by General Kayani and other ISI staff.  The
former senior intelligence official also explained that in 2007 the ISI had guaranteed
that there would be no rigging.  While by all accounts, the 2008 elections were “the
most fair” in recent Pakistani history, constitutionally, the task of safeguarding the
electoral process is the role of the Pakistan Electoral Commission.  

257.    The deep and direct involvement of the ISI, through its most senior leadership,
in the political negotiations between General Musharraf and Ms Bhutto in all of its
stages and the role of all of the intelligence agencies in efforts to sack the Chief
Justice and influence the composition of the Courts are additional examples of their
central function.  

258.    This pervasive involvement of intelligence agencies in diverse spheres, which is
an open secret, has undermined the rule of law, distorted civilian –military relations
and weakened some political and law enforcement institutions.  At the same time, it
has contributed to wide-spread public distrust in those institutions and fed a
generalized political culture that thrives on competing conspiracy theories.(more in part -VI) 

MAIN FINDINGS IN  PART -VI