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India’s To Be or Not To Be Dilemma In Afghanistan
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External Affairs Minister S M Krishna’s visit to Kabul so early in the New Year gives him a real feel of the ground situation. And also the answers to the questions that from Delhi appear as the Sudoku without the key.
Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna’s visit to Afghanistan (Jan 8-9) is taking place when shifting dynamics within Afghanistan as well as changing equations in the region have made the already complex Kabul scene much more enigmatic. US commander General David Petraeus has been confidently speaking of what he sees as an impending and ultimate defeat of the Taliban but no one much less his own government in Washington, appear to be subscribing to his claim.
This is clear from both overt and covert attempts to distinguish between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban factions, and the eagerness to rope in the latter in some sort of a negotiated agreement that fits the pre-determined plan for reduction of ISAF forces from mid-2011. The authors of the strategy are unwilling to factor in a ground reality. It is that the Afghan National Army (ANA) is still considerably weak and ill prepared and that most of the ANA soldiers would not even complete their training schedule before 2012-2013.
Also, under considerable pressure, the Hamid Karzai regime has become open with Pakistan at various levels in a bid to enlist its help for beginning negotiations with the Taliban leaders, Many of them have survived with effortless ease the American drone attacks as well as flush out attempts by the Pakistani security forces, and have remained ensconced within their well entrenched bases in North Waziristan, Bajaur and Swat bordering Afghanistan.
One olive branch from Kabul was the Rabbani mission to Pakistan. The former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani heads the High Council for Peace. He held talks with several important Pakistani politicians in and around the corridors of power and the ‘establishment’. A Pakistani Minister has since confirmed that both the countries have agreed to convene a peace Jirga in the coming months. What else was agreed to? Reports speak of a ‘go ahead’ to Hamid Karzai’s plan to let the Afghan Taliban open a representative office in Turkey, and to grant of amnesty and reintegration incentives to lower level Taliban members who surrender.
Krishna’s talks with his Afghan counterpart Zalmai Rassoul and other Afghan leaders will cover these developments. As a strategic partner of Afghanistan India has a deep interest in early return of peace and tranquility to the war-torn country. Both Delhi and Kabul are alive to the terrorism scenario, particularly the threat to the Indian High Commission and the Indian consulates in the country.
There were two major ghastly attacks on Indian targets one on Oct 9, 2009 and the other on Feb 26, 2010 both claimed several causalities. Yet, a small contingent – 400 strong – of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police is on duty in Afghanistan protecting the Indian interests, and it shows how difficult it is to increase the Indian military presence in Afghanistan whether for security purposes or even in the capacity to train the ANA personnel.
A noted American analyst has cautioned India against increasing its military presence. His case is two-fold. Firstly the Afghans (particularly Pashtuns) still remember that India had fully backed the Soviet occupation (1979-1989) and the Afghan Communist regime till it fell in April 1992. Secondly, Pakistan created and trained and CIA armed Mujahideen believed that the Indian pilots flew combat missions during their war against the Red Army and helped Ahmed Shah Masood and his Northern Alliance!
Well, this American, and many of his ilk should brush up their knowledge of post-9/11 Kabul and Af-Pak scene under President Obama. Also, look at the very many ‘field’ dispatches appearing in their very own venerated journals like the Washington Post that speak of growing frustration in the White House, State Department, Pentagon and the ISAF with Gen Kayani, the presiding deity of Pakistan establishment.
So comes upfront the question: why should peace and development become hostage to the plans of Gen Kayani, who is unwilling to launch operations against the Talibans on his soil, and, is, instead, pampering them..So comes upfront the question: why should peace and development become hostage to the plans of Gen Kayani, who is unwilling to launch operations against the Talibans on his soil, and, is, instead, pampering them as his strategic asset, like in the past. Also the question: why should Delhi play according to the rules laid down by the campaigners, who are after strategic depth, which, in essence means stopping India in its tracts in Afghanistan.
The second question is more relevant in the context of Krishna’s visit to Kabul because Delhi has been playing an activist role in the development of the land locked country. As the sixth largest donor, India has pledged $1.3 billion. All its projects are undertaken in partnership with the Afghan government to achieve the goals identified under the Afghan National Development Strategy.
India’s programmes cover four broad areas – infrastructure projects humanitarian assistance, small and community based development projects, and education and capacity development.
One such venture is the 218 kms road link from Zaranj, near the Iran-Afghanistan border, through Kabul, Kandahar and Herat to Delaram in south-western Afghanistan. India is also rebuilding the Salma Dam power project in Herat Province and is constructing a transmission line to draw power from Uzbekistan, over the Hindu Kush, to Pol-i-Khumri, and thence to Kabul to lighten up the Afghan capital through out the year. Indian firms are investing in Afghan agriculture and mining. India’s steel majors like the SAIL and the House of Tatas are jointly bidding to tap the iron ore and build a steel plant.
All this has become possible, because, contrary to the warnings from friendly Americans and not so friendly Pakistanis, Indians appear to be retaining a great deal of popularity in Afghanistan. In an opinion poll carried out on 20th January 2010, Afghans rated India as the most favourable foreign country involved in their country with an overwhelming 71 percent rating.
The question: why should Delhi play according to the rules laid down by the campaigners of strategic depth, which, in essence means stopping India in its tracts in AfghanistanA greater Indian role in Afghanistan finds favour with Iran and the Central Asian Republics besides Russia. But harnessing such support would require a greater degree of initiatives and Delhi taking in its stride stiff opposition from ill-informed sections of the US government, and hysterical protests from the Pakistani establishment – civilian and military, and the unidirectional religious hawks.
S M Krishna’s visit so early in the New Year gives him a real feel of the ground situation. And also the answers to the questions that from a distance appear as the Sudoku without the key.
Undoubtedly, Kabul theatre poses a formidable challenge to the Indian policymakers particularly as the contours of Taliban’s re-integration are unclear. Diplomatic dexterity will facilitate moves towards a new effective and collective regional effort that will prevent return of Taliban or its clones of all hues. And clear the way towards ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’' peace deal.
Taliban must realise that unless it renounces terrorism and accepts the Afghan constitution, merely changing stripes will lead it nowhere.
--By Shantanu Chakrabarti, Convenor, Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Kolkata
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