India, Pakistan and the Great Game in Afghanistan

Pakistan would try its best to keep out India from not only Afghanistan but also from the regional networks in Central Asia and West Asia notwithstanding New Delhi's good relations with major regional players, says the analyst

January 2011 is turning into a season of high profile visits to Afghanistan. Soon after the visit of the Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, it was the turn of the U.S. Vice President Joe Biden to arrive in what was officially billed as an ‘unannounced visit’ to the troubled country. The officiating Af-Pak Special Envoy, Frank Ruggiero, who is filling the vacancy caused by sudden death of Richard C. Holbrooke, was also in Kabul on Monday (Jan 10) after a visit to Pakistan. U.S. President Obama himself paid a short visit to Afghanistan only last month in December though he could not meet President Karzai during the trip.[i]

And what’s the net result of such visits? There seems be a growing consensus regarding the threat potential of the Taliban across the spectrum in spite of the confidence being displayed by General Petraeus’ camp. S.M. Krishna, for instance, after his return from Kabul described the situation as, “… something, which is very disturbing....The Taliban is an umbrella organisation which shelters LeT and other terrorist organisations.”[ii]  Joe Biden, on the other hand, said during his visit that the coalition forces have managed to stop Taliban momentum in key parts of the country but conceded that the gains are "fragile and reversible." He also went on to add that if, “the Afghan people want it, we (Unites States) won’t leave in 2014.” [iii]

Such statements actually are pointers to the reality that the counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan are not exactly proceeding according to plan. Operation Omaid ( Dari for ‘Hope’), for instance, one of the biggest military offensive launched by the ISAF since 2001 concentrating  on Kandahar, a major stronghold of the Taliban, has resulted in great damages to the villages and affected the harvest cycle. According to a fact finding delegation sent by the Karzai government, the damage caused by the military offensive was worth over 100 million dollars, in part due to damage to crops. Death of civilians in encounters with the coalition troops has also been occurring with disturbing frequency souring the already strained relations between the Karzai regime and the ISAF. The recent torching of 20 NATO oil tankers heading for Afghanistan near Dera Murad Jamali in Balochistan by terrorist groups shows how vulnerable the supply lines running through Pakistan are.

No wonder then that the desperate Karzai government is trying out every possible option to come to some sort of settlement with the so called liberal factions of the Taliban. It is also realized that any deal with Taliban would require some sort of an arrangement with Pakistan, no matter how hard the bargain is driven by the Pakistani establishment (read the army).This, however, is but natural as one analyst points out, “…The fact remains that geography dictates that Pakistan will always play a major role in ensuring the stability of Afghanistan. Arguably, India can be kept out of conflict resolution in Afghanistan, but Pakistan cannot be.”[iv]  Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Zamir Akram, has put forth the same theory when he said, “It is absolutely essential for us that we be part of this approach that is where you bring a political solution to Afghanistan and not be part of only a military approach.”[v]

Pakistan has been increasing its clout in regional formations and evolving networks surrounding Afghanistan and encompassing Central Asian countries. It has an observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and has  been involved with other countries like Russia, and Tajikistan who recently met at Sochi to discuss Afghanistan, the war on terrorism, and efforts to combat drug trafficking. Pakistan has also signed a memorandum with Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in November 2007 to formulate an energy trading project called the ‘CASA 1000.’  The project aims to transmit energy from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, through a network of transmission lines.

Pakistan would try its level best to keep out India from not only Afghanistan but also from the regional networks involving the Central Asian (and also West Asian) countries. True India has good relations with major regional players in both West Asia (like Turkey and Iran) and the Central Asian Republics; it also has the observer status in major regional formations like the SCO; but to maintain Indian profile in Afghanistan now and beyond 2014, Delhi would require firming up the existing geo-strategic equations in Central Asia. Also must work on creating new leverages without taking any thing for granted More so since it has failed to keep up its part of the past pledges say in  countries like Tajikistan where at one time it ran a field hospital and was close to having its first ever overseas  ‘air post’.  Significantly, Tajikistan’s foreign minister has publicly stated that India will not be allowed to operate a combat air force squadron from the country’s Ayni Air Base, virtually ending a nine-year dream for New Delhi of projecting its air power in Central Asia.

There is no guarantee that a new Pakistan-backed regime in Afghanistan is not going to order an exit for the Indians in spite of the general popularity of the Indians among the all sections of the Afghan community. Given the rapidly evolving regional geopolitics no permutation and combination, however, old may be, cannot be taken as granted. This includes any probable Russian backing for Indian ventures in the region. The evolving new world order has witnessed breaking down of old blocs and partnerships and creating of new ones. Af-Pak and the adjoining Central Asian region have not been an exception. To counter the current conundrum, continuous assessment of India’s policy options would be required along with assiduous combination of both soft and hard power.

-Shantanu Chakrabarti

The author is Convenor, Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Calcutta, Kolkata